Citing Peter Singer, Marquis noted the objection that this is speciest in nature. The rough idea here is just this: there is no morally relevant distinction between actions and omissions. Active versus Passive Potentialities A person who advances the potentialities version of the anti-abortion argument has to draw a distinction between active potentialities and passive potentialities, where this distinction is roughly as follows: X has an active potentiality for the acquisition of property P means All of the positive causal factors that are required for a process that would give rise to the possession of property P are present in X. Similarly, even if the fetus has a right to life, it does not have a right to use the pregnant woman's body and life-support functions against her will; and so aborting the pregnancy is permissible in at least some circumstances. It is also where you will post your homework responses. Carmilya: There's a lot of quoting.
Many philosophers, for example, hold that consequentialism is not a satisfactory ethical theory. Most contemporary philosophers believe that birth cannot make a difference to moral rights. Philosophy and Public Affairs 2:1 Autumn 1972 : 37-65, at 52-53. His argument is that having a right to life presupposes that one is capable of desiring to continue existing as a subject of experiences and other mental states. The idea of personhood is fundamental in modern bioethics, while few use the narrow definition of simply being a biological homo sapiens as criteria in significant bioethical issues. By contrast, there are a number of very plausible arguments for the view that potentialities by themselves do not suffice to give something a right to life - arguments that have, on the whole, not even been addressed by defenders of potentiality arguments against abortion. The problem the liberal faces is essentially that of specifying a cutoff point which is not arbitrary: at what stage in the development of a human being doe it cease to be morally permissible to destroy it? Jones is in a similar predicament with his nephew so he also decides to drown the nephew.
In Pojman and Beckwith 1998: 209-233. For while that case is an unsound argument for the view that general potentialities — such as the potentiality for acquiring the capacity for thought — i n themselves can be the basis for a right to life, what the comatose case does show is that when potentialities of certain sorts are relevant to the right to life, it is both active potentialities and passive potentialities that are relevant. Applied to abortion, embryos and fetuses do not fit the criteria for a neo-Lockean person. If the foetus is worthy of protection, then laws against abortion do not create 'victimless crimes' as laws against homosexual relations between consenting adults do. Critics of this argument generally agree that unplugging the violinist is permissible, but claim there are morally relevant disanalogies between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion. It is this claim which will be the focus of attention here.
If we reject these assumptions, then we are free to take account of the contrasting biological and social relationships that make even relatively late abortion morally different from infanticide. Don Marquis Marquis argued from the biological point that all human life, from the moment of conception, is genetically homo sapiens. Abortion: Three Perspectives is divided into two parts: the authors first develop their ideas in depth and then briefly critique the other positions. In his opinion, fetuses are human beings who have the characteristics of Homo sapiens and that is it. For the sake of argument, Thomson assumes that 1 and 2 are true. The last sentence of your 1st paragraph is unclear.
The presence of self-concepts and self-awareness. But, Thomson would say, this makes no difference: I have the right to eject an innocent person from my home, if that person falls through my window. Philosopher similarly concludes that infanticide, particularly of severely infants, is justifiable under certain conditions. Moreoever, an entity cannot desire that it itself continue existing as a subject of experiences and other mental states unless it believes that it is now such a subject. His example: kittens have the right not to be tortured, but they do not have the right not to be killed.
Michael Tooley is the author of the 1972 paper Abortion and Infanticide, one of the most influential works supporting abortion from a bioethical point of view. The traditional objections to Utilitarianism focus on the fact that it operates solely on the first level, taking all the consequences into account in particular cases only. What properties are necessary for being a person and thus having a right to life? Philosophy and Public Affairs 2:1 Autumn 1972 : 37-65, at 52-53. It is then suggested that the difference between the two cases is a matter of potentialities, and thus that potentialities do give something a right to life. So unless there are other objections to abortion and infanticide which are sound, one is forced to conclude that these practices are morally acceptable ones.
It is wrong to torture dogs for fun or to kill wild birds for no reason at all. So a solution that does not entail the death of the infant is available. But mightn't the claim that human infanticide is wrong itself be a basic moral principle? He says that being a person is synonymous with having a right to life, so to have a right to life you need to be considered a person. He claims that it is always permissible to drown newborn kittens and draws conclusions about infanticide. Consequently, what the advocate of the potentialities argument must say is that while it is wrong to destroy active potentialities, it is not wrong - or, at least, not nearly as wrong - to destroy passive potentialities. The Conservative Position The fetus is a person from the moment of conception.
While they agree that a fetus is biologically human, they do not accept that the biological nature of a fetus is sufficient. This essay deals with the question of the morality of abortion and infanticide. That is, he must point to morally relevant differences between a the adult human being and b the fetus or newborn baby. Then since one cannot desire that a certain proposition be true unless one understands it, and since one cannot understand it without possessing the concepts involved in it, it follows that the desires one can have are limited by the concepts one possesses. However, when Jones enters the bathroom he finds that the nephew is already drowning so he simply stands by and watches as events unfold. Whether it is wrong depends on the expected value of the future of the patient.